Any (Reasonable) Doubt: Evaluating a Criminal Defendant\u27s Motion to Strike a Hearing-Impaired Juror for Cause by Avilla, Elisabeth
Florida State University Law Review 
Volume 47 
Issue 1 In Tribute to Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte Article 10 
Fall 2019 
Any (Reasonable) Doubt: Evaluating a Criminal Defendant's 
Motion to Strike a Hearing-Impaired Juror for Cause 
Elisabeth Avilla 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Elisabeth Avilla, Any (Reasonable) Doubt: Evaluating a Criminal Defendant's Motion to Strike a Hearing-
Impaired Juror for Cause, 47 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 259 (2019) . 
https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol47/iss1/10 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Florida State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact efarrell@law.fsu.edu. 
 
ANY (REASONABLE) DOUBT:  
EVALUATING A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 
STRIKE A HEARING-IMPAIRED JUROR FOR CAUSE 
ELISABETH AVILLA* 
ABSTRACT 
Currently, Florida has no law governing how courts should handle 
a motion to strike a hearing-impaired juror for cause in a criminal  
case. Judges use only their discretion and have no legal precedent  
to guide balancing the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial 
with the potential juror’s right not to be discriminated against for  
their hearing impairment. While there is no guiding law for Florida 
courts in criminal cases, there is law guiding Florida civil cases and 
other jurisdictions have evaluated this issue. This Note will propose 
that Florida courts adopt the “any doubt” standard over the “specific 
evidence” standard in evaluating a defendant’s motion to strike a  
hearing-impaired juror for cause. The “any doubt” standard allows the 
trial court to grant the motion to strike so long as there is a reasonable 
doubt the hearing impairment will prevent the potential juror from 
fairly and effectively evaluating the evidence presented as the U.S.  
Constitution requires. This Note will defend the “any doubt” standard 
through a comparison to the evidentiary hearsay rule and argue  
that the “any doubt” standard will not result in the categorical ban of 
hearing-impaired jurors. The “any doubt” standard will fill a current 
hole in Florida law. It will also give trial courts the guidance to  
consider all relevant factors in balancing the defendant’s rights to a 
fair trial and the potential juror’s right not to be discriminated against 
for a hearing impairment. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Sometimes while criminal defense attorneys plead for the life  
and freedom of their clients, their pleas fall on deaf ears, literally. How 
does a state balance the rights of criminal defendants to protect  
their life and freedom with the rights of hearing-impaired jurors1  
to live a life free from discrimination? In State v. Speer, a trial court, 
an appellate court, and the Ohio Supreme Court analyzed this ques-
tion and returned case decisions with three different answers.2 In 
Speer, both the defense and prosecution planned to present an audio  
recording of a 911 tape with the intent to advance arguments  
about whether the defendant’s word choice and tone indicated guilt.3 
Specifically, whether the lack of slurred speech cleared the defendant 
of an allegation of operating a boat while intoxicated.4 A potential  
juror, who eventually became a juror for the trial, had a hearing  
impairment that left her able to hear voices but unable to clearly  
discern and distinguish words without reading the speaker’s lips.5  
The potential juror could not communicate using sign language.6  
Furthermore, she did not have any suggested accommodations  
except changing her positioning and placement in the jury box and  
allowing her to read a transcript of the 911 call audio tape.7 As  
explained later in this Note, this proved extremely problematic for  
the prosecution’s argument, and more importantly, the defense’s  
intended rebuttal and evidence against the prosecution’s argument.8 
Defense counsel raised a challenge for cause to dismiss the potential 
juror because of the lack of available accommodations that would  
guarantee she heard and effectively evaluated the evidence; however, 
the trial court denied this motion.9 What followed at the Ohio Court  
of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court was a consensus that the  
trial court erred, as well as a legal battle over the standard the trial  
 
 1. 42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(1) (2012) (“[P]hysical or mental disabilities in no way diminish 
a person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of society, . . .”); 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) 
(2012) (“[T]he Nation’s proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure 
equality of opportunity, full participation, . . .”); see Mary A. Lynch, The Application of Equal 
Protection to Prospective Jurors with Disabilities: Will Batson Cover Disability-Based 
Strikes?, 57 ALB. L. REV. 289, 296–99 (1993). 
 2. State v. Speer, 925 N.E.2d 584, 590 (Ohio 2010) (affirming in outcome but reversing 
the intermediate appellate court’s legal analysis and holding in State v. Speer, 904 N.E.2d 
956 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008)). 
 3. Speer, 925 N.E.2d at 589. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 587. 
 6. Id. at 588, 591. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 589. 
 9. Id. 




court should have applied in evaluating whether the potential juror 
would impede the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.10 
In Florida, there is no state law or precedent providing guidance in 
this legally delicate scenario. One Florida statute forbids a judge from 
dismissing a potential juror solely because of a hearing impairment 
without the potential juror’s consent in civil trials.11 This rule applies 
unless the court finds that a thorough consideration of the evidence 
the parties plan to present at trial requires consideration by a juror 
without a hearing impairment or timely progression of the trial will be 
considerably affected by the hearing-impaired juror’s presence on the 
jury.12 But the statute explicitly states that this rule shall not be read 
to affect a litigant’s right to exercise a peremptory challenge.13 The 
statute makes no mention of criminal trials.14 Another Florida statute 
permits an interpreter joining the jury during deliberations when it is 
necessary to accommodate a hearing-impaired juror.15  
In Florida civil courts, if doubt exists over whether a hearing- 
impaired potential juror can effectively examine the evidence pre-
sented, then dismissal is limited. 16 The judge may only dismiss the 
 
 10. Id. at 590. 
 11. FLA. STAT. § 40.013(5) (2018).  
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. A preemptory challenge is a challenge the defendant or prosecutor may raise to 
object to a prospective juror’s selection on the panel. Hayes v. State, 94 So. 3d 452, 460 (Fla. 
2012). Preemptory challenges are limited, and parties have discretion in how to use these 
challenges. Id. In contrast, a challenge for cause is an unlimited strike and allows for the 
removal of a prospective juror from the panel on enumerated grounds. Id. A challenge for 
cause should be granted where “any reasonable doubt exists as to whether the juror pos-
sesses an impartial state of mind.” Id. (quoting Busby v. State, 984 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 2004). 
Whereas the standard for granting a preemptory challenge is anytime a party raises the 
challenge, so long as the challenge is not used to exclude a potential juror on the basis of 
race, ethnicity, or gender. Id. Further, in People v. Green, a New York county court held that 
a preemptory challenge based on a juror’s hearing-impairment and “not on any doubt of the 
juror’s ability to communicate. . . was not rationale and violated the juror’s right to equal 
protection . . .” 561 N.Y.S.2d 130, 133 (County Ct. 1990). 
 14. See id. 
 15. Id. § 90.6063(2). This statute overturned Florida case law as recent as 2008 finding 
that the exclusion of jurors who required interpreters was valid as a “public necessity.” E.g., 
Woodel v. State, 985 So. 2d 524, 529 (Fla. 2008). Florida is not alone in finding that an in-
terpreter’s presence in the jury room is permitted. See, e.g., State v. Pacheco, 155 P.3d 745, 
747 (N.M. 2007) (finding that, where an interpreter was given the interpreter’s oath as man-
dated by state statute to interpret testimony correctly, an interpreter was permitted to in-
terpret for a non-English speaking juror both during the trial and deliberations); Saunders 
v. State, 49 S.W.3d 537, 539–40 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that an interpreter’s presence 
during jury deliberations does not impede the criminal defendant’s rights to a fair trial and 
impartial jury). 
 16. Frequently in civil cases defendants are granted less rights than defendants in 
criminal cases, and in some actions and cases, civil defendants are not afforded a jury trial. 
See e.g., Vicki Gordon Kaufman, The Confinement of Mabel Jones: Is There a Right to Jury 
Trial in Civil Commitment Proceedings, 6 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 103 (1978) (discussing the  
importance of a jury in civil cases, focusing on involuntary mental health commitment 




potential juror without that juror’s consent if the judge finds that  
the hearing impairment will considerably impact the juror’s ability to 
hear the specific evidence presented.17 This is what this Note refers to 
as the “specific evidence” standard, which is the appropriate standard  
for a civil trial; however, it is not an appropriate standard for a crimi-
nal trial. In many ways, criminal and civil trials differ. A criminal  
defendant has significantly more at stake than a civil defendant— 
particularly, the defendant’s life and liberty.18 Thus, the U.S. Consti-
tution,19 Florida Constitution,20 and courts throughout the country  
routinely and rightfully place significantly higher protections for  
defendants in criminal court than in civil court.21 This deference to  
the rights of criminal defendants should continue into the evaluation 
over the evidence the defendant needs to present at trial before  
hearing-impaired potential jurors. To continue this deference to  
the rights of criminal defendants, Florida should adopt the “any  
doubt” standard, which requires the court to grant the defendant’s  
motion to strike a hearing-impaired juror for cause if the defense can 
present any reasonable doubt that the juror could effectively evaluate 
the evidence and provide the defendant with a fair trial.22 As this  
Note will later discuss, an essential part of the “any doubt” standard 
 
decisions). HEALTH, LEGAL SYSTEMS ACCESS FOR PERSONS WITH HEARING LOSS: AN 
INSTRUCTOR’S GUIDEBOOK 22 (1st ed. 2010). 
 17. FLA. STAT. § 40.013(5) (2018). 
 18. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 19. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 20. The Florida Constitution grants the right to,  
  In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall, upon demand, be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation, and shall be furnished a copy of the 
charges, and shall have the right to have compulsory process for witnesses, to 
confront at trial adverse witnesses, to be heard in person, by counsel or both, and 
to have a speedy and public trial by impartial jury in the county where the crime 
was committed.  
FLA. CONST. art. 1 § 16(a).  
 21. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (disallowing any party in civil or criminal cases to present 
character evidence but allowing specific exceptions for a defendant in a criminal case to pre-
sent evidence of the defendant or alleged victim’s pertinent character trait); Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004) (holding that where testimonial statements of an 
unavailable witness are at issue in a criminal case the Sixth Amendment demands the state-
ments are only admitted if the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination); 
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968) (holding that a co-defendant’s confession 
in a joint criminal trial violates the non-confessing defendant’s Sixth Amendment Confron-
tation Clause right because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite the instruction to 
the contrary, will look into the co-defendant’s confession in determining whether the non-
confessing defendant is guilty or innocent); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 
U.S. 422, 437–38 (1978) (explaining the common law tradition to resolve ambiguity in crim-
inal statutes in favor of lenity towards the defendant). 
 22. State v. Speer, 904 N.E.2d 956, 961 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008), aff’d, 925 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 
2010) (affirming in outcome but reversing the intermediate appellate court’s legal analysis 
and holding). 




is the reasonableness caveat. A fair trial and jury service are both  
important parts of America’s Constitution and society. The “any doubt” 
standard best balances ensuring both a defendant’s right to a fair  
trial and the hearing-impaired community’s participation and access 
to jury service.23 
Whether the defendant has received a fair trial hinges on two  
constitutional considerations: first, the fairness of the jury selection 
process, and second, whether the case and evidence presented was 
fairly evaluated by the jury.24 This Note will focus on the second  
consideration, whether the case and evidence presented was fairly 
evaluated by the jury. This Note will consider the voir dire process,25 
particularly the actions the judge and the lawyer may take to deter-
mine whether a potential juror with a hearing impairment can  
effectively evaluate the evidence and provide the defendant with a  
fair trial. Additionally, this Note will consider the trial and delibera-
tions process and whether a potential juror’s hearing impairment will 
impact their effective evaluation of the evidence during these trial 
stages. 
After comparing the “specific evidence” with the “any doubt”  
standard, this Note will advance the conclusion that the “any doubt” 
standard is preferable because this standard allows trial courts the 
proper level of discretion necessary to determine whether a hearing 
impairment will prevent a potential juror from providing the defend-
ant with a fair trial. The “any doubt” standard also allows appellate 
courts the discretion to evaluate the trial court’s decision in whether 
to grant an defendant’s motion to strike a hearing-impaired potential 
juror for cause.26 This Note will compare the “any doubt” standard  
 
 23.  
  It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of 
public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community. . . . 
[T[he exclusion from jury service of otherwise qualified groups not only violates 
our Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war with our basic con-
cepts of a democratic society and a representative government. 
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (footnote omitted) (evaluating whether a Texas 
grand jury selection scheme violated the Fourteenth Amendment by excluding black jurors); 
Harold Craig Manson, Jury Selection: The Courts, The Constitution, and The Deaf, 11 PAC. 
L.J. 967, 970 (1980) (arguing against the exclusion of the deaf community from jury service). 
 24. Manson, supra note24, at 968–69. 
 25. Voir Dire, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “voir dire” as “a pre-
liminary examination of a prospective juror by a judge or lawyer to decide whether the pro-
spect is qualified and suitable to serve on a jury. Loosely, the term refers to the jury-selection 
phase of a trial”). 
 26. This Note will deal only with for cause strikes to jurors. Nothing in Florida laws, 
rules of criminal procedure, or precedent indicates that a hearing-impaired juror may not be 
stricken in a preemptory challenge. This Note will only analyze situations in which the de-
fendant has attempted to strike a hearing-impaired juror for cause and has already used or 
plans to use the allotted preemptory strikes on other potential jurors. 




to other rules and standards in the judicial process created by legisla-
tures and courts, particularly the general hearsay ban and its  
numerous exceptions.27 This Note will ultimately conclude that the 
“any doubt” standard is the proper standard for courts to determine 
whether a potential juror’s hearing impairment will impact an defend-
ant’s constitutional right to a fair trial. Further, applying the “any 
doubt” standard will not result in a categorical ban of hearing- 
impaired jurors.28  
II.   THE “SPECIFIC EVIDENCE” STANDARD 
In Ohio, courts must excuse a hearing-impaired juror under a chal-
lenge for cause in criminal cases when no reasonable accommodation 
exists that would enable the juror to perceive and evaluate the specific 
evidence the parties plan to present at trial.29 In Speer, a defendant 
faced two criminal charges in relation to an accident that occurred 
while the defendant was allegedly intoxicated and operating a boat.30 
The crux of the State’s and Speer’s arguments at trial rested on Speer’s 
speech and tone of voice while making a 911 call.31 The State planned 
on encouraging jurors to take Speer’s calm tone and demeanor during 
the call as evidence of his guilt, whereas Speer intended to argue  
he was not intoxicated because his speech on the tape was calm and 
collected rather than slurred.32  
Linda Leow-Johannsen, a potential juror, disclosed during voir  
dire that she suffered from a hearing impairment and, while she could 
hear voices, she did not understand spoken words unless she read the 
speaker’s lips.33 Importantly, Ms. Leow-Johannsen revealed she may 
miss information if the speaker did not face her or if a party presented 
 
 27. FED. R. EVID. 801-804; FLA. STAT. §§ 90.801, .803–.804 (2018). 
 28. Notably, Florida does not have a state statute requiring a juror to “speak English.” 
See FLA. STAT. § 40.01 (listing juror qualifications only as reaching majority age, citizenship 
of the county calling for jury service, and possessing valid, state issued identification but 
making no reference to an English-speaking requirement); FLA. STAT. § 40.013 (2019) (listing 
categories of prospective jurors that may be excused from jury service and making no refer-
ence to an English-speaking requirement). As this Note focuses on Florida law, it will not 
delve into this problematic requirement. For an analysis of the issue and why these state 
statutes should be changed, see generally Cynthia L. Brown, A Challenge to the English-
Language Requirement of the Juror Qualification Provision of New York’s Judiciary Law,  
39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 479 (1994); Lynch, supra note 1, at 298; Claudia Lopez, Providing 
American Sign Language Interpreters to Prevent Deaf-Juror Discrimination, TRENDS  
IN STATE COURTS, https://www.ncsc.org/sitecore/content/microsites/trends/home/Monthly-
Trends-Articles/2015/Providing-American-Sign-Language-Interpreters-to-Prevent-Deaf- 
Juror-Discrimination.aspx [https://perma.cc/2NP2-LR5V].  
 29. State v. Speer, 925 N.E.2d 584, 589 (Ohio 2010). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 587. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 




an audio recording as evidence.34 Speer motioned to excuse Ms. Leow-
Johannsen for cause, citing both parties’ reliance on the 911 call  
recording.35 The trial court denied the motion, finding proper accom-
modations were available that would enable Ms. Leow-Johannsen  
to fully and fairly evaluate the recording.36 The trial court arranged for 
Ms. Leow-Johannsen to sit where she had a clear view of the speaking 
attorneys and witnesses and allowed a reading of the court reporter’s 
transcription of the 911 call recording.37 The trial court also assured 
Ms. Leow-Johannsen that she could advise the court at any time if she 
missed something and the parties would repeat themselves.38  
At the close of the trial, the jury acquitted Speer of one charge  
and convicted him of a second charge.39 Speer appealed and the Ohio 
Court of Appeals reversed, finding the trial court erred in denying 
Speer’s challenge for cause against Ms. Leow-Johannsen’s jury  
service.40 The Court of Appeals stated there was no way to determine 
whether Ms. Leow-Johannsen properly heard and fairly considered  
all of the testimony and evidence presented, particularly the 911 audio 
tape and the arguments focusing on Speer’s speech and audio clues.41 
The Court of Appeals utilized the “any doubt” standard, holding  
that if “any doubt exists that a juror can adequately and completely 
perceive and evaluate all the evidence, whether because of a physical 
impairment, mental capabilities, or other reason that would interfere 
with the performance of a juror’s duties, the trial court must excuse 
that juror for cause.”42 The Supreme Court of Ohio agreed with the 
holding, but reversed the “any doubt” standard and applied the “spe-
cific evidence” standard, a narrower standard.43 The Ohio Supreme 
Court held that in deciding whether to grant or deny a challenge for 
cause of a hearing-impaired potential juror on the basis of the hearing 
impairment, the court must consider the “specific evidence” the parties 
anticipate introducing at trial and whether the court can provide a 
reasonable accommodation that will allow the juror to effectively serve 
on the jury.44 In making this determination, the Ohio Supreme Court 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. State v. Speer, 904 N.E.2d 956, 960–61 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008), aff’d, 925 N.E.2d 584 
(Ohio 2010) (affirming in outcome but reversing the intermediate appellate court’s legal 
analysis and holding). 
 43. Speer, 925 N.E.2d at 589–90. 
 44. Id. at 590. 




mandates a court balance equal access to jury service with the  
defendant’s right to a fair trial, taking the right to a fair trial as the 
“predominant concern.”45  
 However, a serious issue arises under the “specific evidence” 
standard if the defendant has a legitimate doubt that the evidence  
will be adequately evaluated but cannot point to a particular auditory 
piece of evidence or a witness who is known to speak softly or mutter. 
46 Whether a hearing-impaired potential juror may be reasonably  
accommodated without impairing the defendant’s right to a fair trial 
is a question of fact that turns on the extent of the potential juror’s 
hearing loss,47 the available accommodations,48 and the defendant’s  
arguments.49 As the Wisconsin Court of Appeals stated in State v. 
Turner, the trial court will always have to determine the extent  
that the hearing impairment will impact the potential juror’s  
ability to evaluate the evidence.50 The analysis of how the hearing  
impairment will impact the defendant’s right to a fair trial is fact- 
intensive and deserving of a standard that allows the trial court the 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. One example of a time when the defendant may have a reasonable doubt about a 
potential juror’s hearing-impairment impacting a fair trial would constitute hearing-impair-
ments such as Ms. Leow-Johannsen’s. Ms. Leow-Johannsen admitted to having a hearing-
impairment but did not use any auxiliary aids to improve her hearing, rather she relied only 
on lip reading. As discussed infra, there are numerous auxiliary aids that would render a 
hearing-impairment irrelevant to a constitutionally fair trial, however the potential juror 
must utilize those aids, rather than relying on aids such as lip reading, which can be notori-
ously unreliable or impacted by something as simple as the juror looking away for one sec-
ond. Speech Reading, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND Prevention (last reviewed by pub-
lisher Mar. 21, 2019) (when discussing lip reading as a supplement to hearing loss in chil-
dren, “About 40% of the sounds in the English language can be seen on the lips of a speaker 
in good conditions . . . . A good speech reader might be able to see only 5 to 5 words in a 12-
word sentence.”); Hearing Loss–Lipreading, BETTER HEALTH CHANNEL: VICTORIA ST. GOV. 
(last updated Apr. 2017), https://www.betterhealth.vic.gov.au/health/conditionsandtreat-
ments/hearing-loss-lipreading [https://perma.cc/D8WJ-P2CD] (“Lipreading cannot make up 
for hearing that has been lost.”); see also Nicholas A. Altieri et al., Some Normative Data on 
Lip-Reading Skills, J. ACOUSTICAL SOC’Y AM., July 2011, at 2 (conducting a study on non-
hearing-impaired college students and funding that “the meal lip-reading score in visual-
only sentence recognition was 12.4% correct. . .). 
 47. State v. Turner, 521 N.W.2d 148, 150–51 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). 
 48. For example, a juror with only a slight hearing-impairment who reads lips may be 
fully and effectively accommodated by moving the juror closer to the witness stand, or a juror 
whose hearing is impaired may utilize the court’s auxiliary aids and fully and effectively 
evaluate and hear everything presented at trial. Manson, supra note 24, at 977; Frequently 
Asked Questions, THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT OF FLORIDA, https://circuit8.org/ 
jury-faqs/ [https://perma.cc/44DB-54EN] (offering accommodations for jurors); Juror Infor-
mation, THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT OF FLORIDA, https://www.jud3.flcourts.org/ 
jurors/ [https://perma.cc/NWK3-HQ4M] (offering accommodations for jurors).  
 49. A court would likely not credit a defendant’s arguments that categorically all hear-
ing-impaired jurors violate the United States or Florida’s equal protection clauses found in 
their respective constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. 14; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 2.  
 50. Id. at 151. 




full discretion necessary to evaluate the case, the hearing impairment, 
and the defendant’s arguments about whether any doubt exists.51 
III.   THE “ANY DOUBT” STANDARD IS THE PROPER TEST FOR 
DETERMINING IF A HEARING-IMPAIRED POTENTIAL JUROR  
MAY BE STRICKEN FOR CAUSE DURING VOIR DIRE 
Both appellate courts in Ohio were proper in holding that the  
accommodations made for Ms. Leow-Johannsen were inadequate in 
providing Speer with a fair trial afforded under the U.S. Constitu-
tion.52 However, the “any doubt” standard is the proper legal  
standard and the Ohio Supreme Court erred in dismissing it as too 
broad.53 The “any doubt” standard allows trial courts the proper 
amount of discretion necessary to accurately evaluate the potential  
juror’s hearing impairment, the accommodations available, and the  
defendant’s right to a fair trial. Additionally, the “any doubt” standard 
does so without requiring the court to find a specific piece of evidence 
a party intends to present that might cause the hearing-impaired  
juror to ineffectively evaluate and consider.54 Not every juror will have 
the same hearing impairment, not every party will present auditory 
evidence in the same way, and not every accommodation will equally 
assist every juror with a hearing impairment. The “any doubt”  
standard gives the trial court room to evaluate the situation under the 
defendant’s challenge for cause to determine the best way to proceed 
that does not discriminate against the hearing-impaired juror while 
properly considering and prioritizing the defendant’s constitutional 
right to a fair trial.  
When the trial court in State v. Speer declined the defendant’s chal-
lenge for cause of Ms. Leow-Johannsen, the court candidly admitted it 
could not guarantee that the accommodations provided to Ms. Leow-
Johannsen would succeed in assisting her in fully and fairly consider-
ing the evidence presented.55 The Court of Appeals correctly points  
out that the potential juror did not read sign language, so providing  
an interpreter was not an effective accommodation.56 The Court of  
Appeals suggests in dicta that, had an American Sign Language  
interpreter been a viable option for Ms. Leow-Johannsen, then the  
 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Speer, 925 N.E.2d at 590. 
 53. Id. 
 54. For an example of the application of the any doubt standard, see the appellate 
court’s application of the standard in State v. Speer, 904 N.E.2d 956, 960–61 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2008), aff’d, 925 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 2010) (affirming in outcome but reversing the intermedi-
ate appellate court’s legal analysis and holding).  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 960. 




reasonable doubt argument would have been weakened because the 
“interpreter would have ensured that the juror would have been 
alerted every time someone spoke.”57  
Ms. Leow-Johannsen presented doubt as a juror because she could 
only effectively understand auditory evidence if she read lips.58 If  
she turned her head, looked down to take a sip of water, or even  
momentarily shifted her eyes she may not have seen that a speaker 
started talking and may not have effectively understood the evidence 
presented because she missed some of it.59 Ms. Leow-Johannsen  
presented even more reasonable doubt when the Court of Appeals  
analyzed the specific evidence offered in the case, the 911 tape. 60  
The Court of Appeals found the outcome “even more troubling” under 
the specific evidence test.61 While reading the transcription of the  
911 call Ms. Leow-Johannsen could not effectively evaluate whether 
the defendant’s speech was or was not slurred and whether the defend-
ant did or did not sound too calm.62 Both the State and the defendant’s 
arguments depended on the jury’s interpretation of the tone, words, 
inflection, and speech patterns in Speer’s 911 call.63 
One potential concern about the “any doubt” standard is that it may 
categorically exclude hearing-impaired persons from jury service.64 In 
discussing the “any doubt” standard, the Ohio Court of Appeals in 
State v. Speer specifically noted that, where the evidence presented 
involves “only the bare meaning of the words,” the potential juror’s 
hearing impairment will likely have little to no impact on the potential 
juror’s ability to effectively consider all of the evidence presented.65 
Thus, “if any doubt exists that a juror can adequately and completely 
perceive and evaluate all the evidence . . . the trial court must excuse 
that juror for cause.”66  
This discussion highlights an important check on the “any doubt” 
standard: the doubt must be reasonable. It is unlikely reasonable 
doubt will exist as to whether hearing impairment prevents a potential 
juror from effectively perceiving and evaluating the evidence.67 For 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 961. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. State v. Speer, 925 N.E.2d 584, 589 (Ohio 2010). 
 64. This concern was briefly presented by the Ohio Supreme Court in their opinion in 
State v. Speer. Id. at 590. 
 65. Speer, 904 N.E.2d at 961, aff’d, 925 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 2010) (affirming in outcome 
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example, the Florida Evidence Code requires courts to appoint a  
qualified interpreter or auxiliary aid for a juror with a hearing  
impairment.68 Florida statutes also require that an interpreter take  
an oath to make a true interpretation.69 Additionally, when consider-
ing appropriate accommodations, the Americans with Disabilities  
Act requires primary consideration be given to the accommodation  
requested by the individual with the hearing impairment.70 Presuma-
bly, the hearing-impaired potential juror has a preferred accommoda-
tion, is familiar with this accommodation, and has been thriving in  
life regardless of any hearing impairment.71 Thus, in many cases the 
accommodation will likely not be at issue.72 Rather, it is when doubt 
exists that goes beyond the defendant arguing generalizations and  
stereotypes of the hearing-impaired community that the “any doubt” 
standard would allow striking juror for cause because of a hearing  
impairment. 
In People v. Guay, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the  
dismissal of a hearing-impaired juror when doubt existed over whether 
the juror could properly perceive and evaluate the evidence pre-
sented.73 The trial court found doubt existed when the potential  
juror answered questions incorrectly because he could not properly 
hear the question and the potential juror’s body language indicated  
he was not hearing everything said during voir dire.74 While the court 
had a specific witness in mind which the potential juror might struggle 
to hear (a soft-spoken child), the court properly applied the “any doubt” 
standard and dismissed the juror when a reasonable doubt existed.75 
The potential juror’s difficulty in answering questions during voir  
dire showed that the court had reason to doubt whether the juror could 
adequately understand and evaluate any of the testimonial evidence 
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to be presented.76 Additionally, when asked if any accommodations 
would assist the potential juror, he responded that only moving to the 
front row of the jury box would help.77 However, when this accommo-
dation was provided the trial court still found it “readily apparent” 
that the potential juror was not hearing the questions asked during 
voir dire.78 The court did not base its dismissal of the potential juror 
for cause based on the soft-spoken witness; rather, the court relied on 
the potential juror’s inability to hear questions presented and the lack 
of accommodations available to assist the potential juror.79 Presuma-
bly, if the potential juror had an effective accommodation available, 
either through an interpreter or auxiliary hearing aid, or even if  
moving the juror to the front of the jury box had been effective, the 
court would not have granted the defendant’s motion for cause.80 
On the other hand, in People v. Guzman, the New York Court of 
Appeals found that a prospective juror’s civil right to serve on a jury is 
conditioned on the individual criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial 
and the prospective juror’s ability to provide a fair trial.81 In Guzman, 
a hearing-impaired juror communicated through Signed English  
rather than American Sign Language.82 The court found significance 
in the juror’s ability to communicate through Signed English, which  
is a literal translation of the English words to signs, rather than  
American Sign Language, which is more akin to a nonliteral transla-
tion to a different language.83 The court relied on the Signed English 
and the juror’s ability to read lips to find that the hearing impairment 
did not render the juror incapable of performing the duties of a juror 
in a reasonable manner.84  
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The primary function of a juror is to provide a fair trial.85 As the 
court in Guzman stated, a juror may complete this primary function 
at minimum by understanding the evidence presented, evaluating the 
evidence rationally, communicating effectively during deliberations, 
comprehending the court’s instructions, and requiring accommoda-
tions that do not interfere with a criminal defendant’s constitutional 
rights at trial.86 The Court of Appeals found because the juror could 
speak English fluently, read lips, and communicate effectively in 
Signed English with an interpreter, the juror was properly admitted 
to the jury, as he would be just as effective on the jury as a hearing 
juror.87 This is unlike Carrillo v. People, where a juror’s response to 
questions asked by the parties and the court during voir dire showed 
he was having trouble hearing the questions resulting in inaccurate 
answers.88 Additionally, no accommodations were available to assist 
the potential juror in effectively evaluating the evidence.89  
The “any doubt” standard allows trial courts to utilize discretion in 
evaluating the case before the court and the potential juror in voir dire. 
It also allows appellate courts to more accurately balance the right of 
the defendant to a fair trial and the rights of citizens with a hearing 
impairment to jury service when determining whether a trial court 
abused its discretion. For example, in State v. Turner, the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals ordered a new trial when the defendant appealed  
because two jurors admitted they had not heard all of the testimony 
presented.90 Both jurors testified during a voir dire after the trial had 
commenced that they missed a little testimony and wished they  
had heard more.91 One of the two jurors told the court he had not 
missed so much testimony that he could not reach a fair and impartial 
verdict.92 The trial judge felt this testimony was sufficient to guarantee 
the defendant a fair trial and thus denied the defendant’s motion for  
a mistrial so long as the court utilized an amplification system for  
the remainder of the trial.93 The appellate court reversed, finding  
that, once a juror has not heard material evidence which bears on a 
defendant’s guilt or innocence because of a hearing impairment, prej-
udice against the defendant must be assumed.94 The appellate court 
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reasoned that each juror must not only hear the witness’ testimony  
to evaluate the evidence, but also hear the witness’ “[t]onal quality, 
volume, and speech patterns” to effectively evaluate the witness’ cred-
ibility.95 Had the court applied the “any doubt” standard and found 
that no effective accommodations were available, the defendant’s  
motion to strike for cause, if filed, would have been granted. 
IV.   HEARSAY COMPARISON 
Often in courtrooms evidence and witnesses are excluded because 
of public policy, especially in criminal cases. For example, hearsay  
evidence,96 while open to many exceptions and exclusions, generally is 
excluded because as a matter of public policy the fact-finder cannot 
sufficiently evaluate the credibility of the declarant when the declar-
ant’s statement is spoken by another witness in the courtroom.97 
Courts are concerned with evaluating “the truth of the matter asserted 
in the statement” when the declarant98 is not in the courtroom to  
defend their statement through direct and cross-examination.99 The 
U.S. Supreme Court has routinely held that hearsay statements, even 
when permitted by an exception, must contain adequate “indicia of  
reliability”100 and may be excluded where it is not accompanied by “a 
showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”101 Really, 
the general ban on hearsay stems from a public policy exclusion that, 
in general, one witness coming to court to testify about what another 
declarant said is not reliable or trustworthy evidence.102 When 
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evaluating hearsay evidence, the jury cannot evaluate the declarant’s 
verbal and physical cues of credibility because the declarant is not  
in the courtroom; rather, the witness is testifying as to what the  
declarant said.103 Without the declarant speaking in the courtroom, the 
hearsay rule is concerned with the lack of testing on the evidence by 
various courtroom tools to ensure credibility. These include declaring 
the testimony under oath and evaluating the witness’ demeanor dur-
ing direct examination, and credibility during cross-examination.104  
Despite these concerns, both the Federal Rules of Evidence and  
the Florida Evidence Code have over thirty exceptions and exclusions 
to the general ban on hearsay.105 The types of hearsay evidence  
permissible despite the general ban were made exceptions and exclu-
sions for two reasons: necessity of the type of hearsay evidence and  
the indicia of reliability that accompanies this type of evidence more 
so than other types of hearsay.106 The exceptions and exclusions reflect 
a public policy determination that the types of hearsay evidence  
permitted despite the general ban on hearsay tend to be necessary  
and trustworthy, despite the hearsay evidence’s lack of credibility 
shown by standard courtroom tools for ensuring credibility.  
The concerns brought out by hearsay statements are not perfectly 
analogous to the concerns regarding hearing-impaired jurors in 
providing a criminal defendant with a fair trial; however, it is proper 
to compare the general hearsay exclusion and the “any doubt” stand-
ard regarding hearing-impaired jurors sitting on criminal juries.  
One concern for the “any doubt” standard is that a hearing-impaired 
juror may lack the ability to pick up verbal credibility clues and other 
courtroom tools utilized to evaluate witness credibility. The Ohio  
Supreme Court acknowledged in State v. Speer that, depending on  
the type and extent of the hearing impairment, a potential hearing-
impaired juror might not effectively evaluate the evidence’s credibility 
as much as a non-hearing-impaired juror.107 However, the extent of 
this risk would turn on the extent of the individual’s hearing impair-
ment and the accommodations provided. For example, in People v. 
Guzman, a juror who was reading lips in addition to an interpreter 
signing English (as opposed to American Sign Language) could  
evaluate verbal testimony just as effectively, if not more so, than a 
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non-hearing-impaired juror.108 The court reasoned the juror could  
effectively evaluate the evidence because the signer could convey  
the speaker’s testimony through inflictions in sign and the hearing  
impairment would not prevent the juror from watching the witness’ 
body language and reading the witness’ lips during testimony.109 A 
hearing impairment would not prevent a potential juror from reading 
the body language of a witness and evaluating the witness’ manner-
isms on direct and cross-examination. While courts have held that the 
credibility of a witness is determined by more than just the witness’ 
words, verbal and visual credibility clues are not uniformly utilized by 
every factfinder and are not essential or even routinely accurate in 
evaluating credibility.110 
These concerns are alleviated because interpreters can incorporate 
tone and inflection into their interpretation.111 During witness testi-
mony, the interpreter can provide exact terminology, pausing, inflec-
tion, and emphasis as the witness testifies. Even concerts for heavy 
metal music provide interpreters who interpret the show by doing 
more than just signing the lyrics.112 Interpreters who sign music know 
that signing is about more than merely conveying the lyrics; it is about 
conveying the feel for the music, the tone of the song, and the layers of 
musical instruments and melodies that go into the music.113 Thus, it  
is possible for sign language interpreters, both in American Sign Lan-
guage and in Signed English, to show the speaker’s tone and inflection 
through their interpretation. If a witness says, “I was not holding that 
bag” they might emphasize “NOT” or “THAT” and the sentence would 
mean different things based on which word was emphasized. For ex-
ample, the statement “I was NOT holding that bag” shows the witness 
is strongly denying that they were holding the bag, whereas the state-
ment “I was not holding THAT bag” shows the witness might admit to 
holding a different bag, but not the specific bag at issue. Each version 
of the sentence carries a different connotation and meaning, which the 
interpreter can convey to the hearing-impaired juror through the man-
ner and method used to interpret the sentence.  
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The presence of an interpreter throughout the trial and jury  
deliberations can ensure that a hearing-impaired juror can fairly and 
effectively consider all of the evidence presented through a translation. 
Additionally, through a translation that includes inflections, tone, and 
other verbal credibility clues. This would alleviate concerns that the 
“any doubt” standard would result in the general ban of the hearing-
impaired from jury service. As with hearsay evidence, even with a 
standard that allows trial courts more discretion, the discretion would 
not result in the categorical ban of hearing-impaired jurors. The  
hearsay ban is a large categorical ban; but, when accompanied by  
public policy considerations, the exceptions and exclusions, and the  
allowance of trustworthy and necessary evidence, the hearsay ban is 
not the categorical ban one would think when first learning about it. 
Similarly, allowing trial courts discretion to truly evaluate the poten-
tial juror’s hearing impairment, the accommodations available, and 
the defendant’s specific motion will not result in a categorical ban of 
hearing-impaired jurors.  
V.   JUROR RELIANCE ON VERBAL AND  
VISUAL CREDIBILITY CLUES 
Some courts have denied a hearing-impaired potential juror  
from jury service because of a concern that the hearing impairment 
will prevent the potential juror from evaluating verbal and visual  
credibility clues.114 As stated above, a qualified interpreter for either 
American Sign Language or Signed English can interpret not only  
the literal language but also verbal credibility clues such as tone  
and inflection.115 There is no evidence conclusively proving that an  
understanding of verbal credibility clues such as tone and inflection 
actually leads jurors to the truth more than an objective evaluation  
of the testimony presented.116 In fact, studies suggest that visual  
credibility clues, such as the witness’ physical demeanor and presen-
tation, play as much if not a greater role in a juror’s evaluation  
of the evidence than verbal credibility clues.117 A U.S. District Court  
in Arkansas reasoned that striking a deaf juror for cause was allowed 
partially because the hearing-impaired juror would need to constantly 
keep her eyes on the interpreter and, thus, would not see the body  
language of the attorneys or witnesses.118 This conclusion ignores  
simple solutions the court could implement to allow a hearing- 
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impaired juror to see both the interpreter and the testifying witness, 
such as positioning the interpreter near the witness so that both are 
in the juror’s line of vision during the testimony.  
Additionally, with the advancement of social science studies, courts 
have begun to alter old perceptions of how witnesses and juries oper-
ate. For example, in State v. Guilbert, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
overruled two previous cases that found expert witness testimony on 
the fallacy of eyewitness identification was inadmissible.119 The court 
identified eight scientifically valid propositions that were counter- 
intuitive about the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony, 
including the common false assumption that the more confident a  
witness is in their identification, the more accurate it is.120 This hold-
ing was in tension with an earlier U.S. Supreme Court’s holding  
in Neil v. Biggers, which identified the level of confidence displayed  
by the witness as one of five factors that indicate the credibility of an 
eyewitness.121 These visual clues relied on by the Eckstein court are  
not a reliable and accurate measure for a juror to use in determining 
credibility, especially considering the advancements made in the  
interpretation profession.122  
A defendant’s objection to a potential juror with a hearing impair-
ment because the hearing impairment could prevent the juror from 
hearing verbal credibility clues, or the interpreter could prevent the 
juror from seeing visual credibility clues would not survive under the 
“any doubt” standard. The “any doubt” standard does not literally 
mean “any possible doubt”; rather, it refers to any reasonable doubt. 
Defense counsel’s strike for cause would not survive the trial court’s 
scrutiny if the attorney advanced an argument that hearing-impaired 
jurors categorically cannot effectively evaluate the evidence presented 
because of a lack of ability to evaluate verbal and visual credibility 
clues.123 As the Ohio Court of Appeals stated in their opinion in State 
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v. Speer, where the evidence in a case involves only the “bare meaning” 
of words, a juror’s hearing impairment might have no prejudice at all 
on the juror’s ability to evaluate the evidence presented.124 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
A defendant in a criminal case is and should be afforded greater 
protection at trial than a defendant in a civil case. The constitutional 
right of an defendant to a fair trial includes the right to a fair and 
effective consideration of the evidence by the trier of fact.125 When  
a potential juror is hearing-impaired and the defendant raises a  
motion to strike for cause, the trial court needs discretion to properly 
evaluate the extent of the hearing impairment, the available accom-
modations, and whether the defendant is correct in alleging that  
doubt exists over the juror’s ability to fairly and effectively consider 
the evidence presented at trial. The “any doubt” standard gives trial 
courts this discretion, and the “specific evidence” standard narrows 
this discretion to an unworkable degree in some cases. It is not often 
the case that a hearing impairment will prevent the potential juror 
from fairly and effectively evaluating the evidence presented.  
Typically, an interpreter, auxiliary systems, hearing aids, and other 
accommodations will allow a hearing-impaired juror to have abso-
lutely no issue in evaluating the evidence. The world and courts  
have moved past the outdated views of hearing impairments the  
court in Eckstein v. Kirby expressed, and states, such as Florida,  
provide accommodations for jurors and allow interpreters into jury  
deliberations so that all jurors may effectively communicate.126 While 
courts may express hesitation similar to the justifications with the 
general ban on hearsay evidence, those concerns are alleviated by the 
advancement in technology benefitting the hearing-impaired, the 
growth of the sign language interpretation profession, and the discre-
tion allowed to trial courts by the “any doubt” standard. Thus, Florida 
courts and legislators need to adopt the “any doubt” standard to allow 
trial courts the necessary discretion in evaluating whether to grant  
or deny a criminal defendant’s motion to strike a hearing-impaired  
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